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BOOK REVIEWS
EQUITY AND LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY. By Ralph A. Newman. New
York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1961. Pp. 280. $7.50. Sixty-five years ago Mr.
Justice Holmes doubted "whether it would not be a gain if every word of moral
significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other words adopted
which should convey legal terms uncolored by anything outside the law" even at
the cost of losing "the majesty got from ethical associations." 1 How far we have
since traveled from this point of view may be noted in Professor Ralph A. Newman's approach in his most valuable study of the substantive fusion of law and
equity. He sees the main body of our law cut off from that "system of elevated
moral principles which we call equity," 2 and which is still regarded as separate
from the general law. Unlike all the other great legal systems of the world, in
which these principles are applied throughout the law, ours alone applies them in
a relatively narrow area. This restriction contributes to the "sharp differentiation
between law and morals" found only in the Anglo-American legal system and
impeding the "approximate approach by law to ideal justice."3 Professor Newman
proceeds to compare our treatment of equitable principles with that of other legal
systems in the light of the varying results achieved.
Since the end of any legal system is "social justice" 4 why limit the application
of equity's elevated moral principles to a single portion of the law? Since law now
"emanates from popular sovereignty" it is senseless to insist today upon equity as a
separate substantive body of principles restricted functionally to the correction of
some co-ordinate body of legal rules, or to relief from injustice in special types of
cases, 5 for "every case presents a moral problem, and almost all moral problems
are unique."" To resist the complete fusion of law and equity obscures the identity
of equity with justice and prevents the application of equitable solutions of the
problem of relief from hardship7 when the plaintiff's complaint sounds not in
"technical equity" for specific relief, but in common law for damages alone. Our
separate system of equity is the fruit of an accident of history nearly five centuries
ago. The subsequent rationalizations which have perpetuated a double standard
of justice in our system are threadbare in a day when, as Dean Pound points out
in his introduction to Professor Newman's book, "the need is more and more for
general principles" and the "time becomes unsuited for a regime of rules."" Professor Newman's thesis is clear. The moral principles created and systematized in
Chancery long ago by men who drank deeply at the well-springs of natural law
should flow freely through the entire body of our law. Equity is not a special form
of justice reserved for Sundays.
Why then the persistence of the sharp distinction between law and morals,
the substantive separation of law and equity, in our system? Professor Newman
restates the circumstances which led to our separate court of equity, and hence
to the development of an isolated body of equitable principles. Comparative legal
history shows that other legal systems also felt the early demand for institutional
devices to supplement and temper in the name of justice the oft-times harsh incidence of law considered as a set of strictly defined rules. We are reminded of
Aristotle's treatment of epieikeia, of the labors of the Roman praetors, of St. Louis
IX holding his own court of justice under the oak of Vincennes. In our own
history, as Pollock and Maitland pointed out,0 long before the Chancellor began
to sit in his independent court of equity with his own procedure and with remedies
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of his own invention by way of specific relief, common law judges did not disdain to administer a species of what we would later call "equity." For better or
for worse (and in the long sweep of history it may have been the former) the
common law courts relinquished this nascent equitable jurisdiction and for "equity"
one went thereafter to the Chancellor alone. Two substantive law systems developed side by side in more or less peaceful co-existence, occasionally disturbed
by political pressures and jurisdictional jealousies, which diminished when the
length of the Chancellor's foot ceased to be the measure of equity, and Chancery
precedents became quite as stable as those of the sister courts of the common law.
Nineteenth-century procedural reforms did not produce the substantive fusion
of law and equity, if indeed such fusion was ever the intent of the reformers. Five
centuries of separation had established an inveterate tradition. Right measured by
writ, though wounded, lived on. Even the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of
1938 left unchanged the substantive distinction between legal and equitable remedies;
equitable defenses did not become legal defenses; the principles guiding the courts
in granting or refusing injunctive relief remained the same.' 0 In the 20th century
courts will still say that in an action for specific performance the "principles of
ethics have a more extensive sway than in ordinary cases.""' For Professor Newman
such propositions are anachronisms, their rationalizations devoid of sense.
What then are the effects of the bifurcation of our legal system? How do
they compare with the effects of complete fusion of law and equity in the other
great world legal systems?
In successive chapters, brilliantly concise, with a wealth of citations to AngloAmerican case law and to the codes of other legal systems (French, German, Swiss,
Italian, Russian, Scots, Islamic, Austrian, Hungarian, Polish, Scandinavian, Spanish,
Greek, Chinese, Japanese, Swedish, Indian) the author compares the effects of
our resistance to the complete coalescence of law and equity with the results
achieved in systems which do not admit that justice means one thing in "equity"
and something else in "law." Selected for this comparative study are areas which
we traditionally consider as peculiar to "equitable jurisdiction," e.g., unfairness in
the negotiation and formation of contracts, mistake, frustration, hardship, unjust enrichment. From the standpoint of the demands of justice it is our system which
appears to come off second-best in the provocative comparison which Professor
Newman makes between the results of our system restricting the sweep of moral
principles to cases traditionally within equity's exclusive domain, and those systems
in which no such hampering limitations obtain.' 2 In a fascinating chapter Professor Newman shows how much more completely the doctrine of mistake has
been extended and enriched in other systems where anything short of total fusion
is simply incomprehensible. In another chapter it is submitted that the development of the doctrine of frustration in contract law lags far behind its progress in
other systems. Elsewhere, judges are not constrained by the debris of past history
to make the nature of the desired remedy - whether for specific relief or for
damages - the sovereign test for invoking the higher ethics known to equity.
Professor Newman has made a lasting contribution to comparative law. Students,
teachers, lawyers and judges will remain his grateful debtors.
Although this able study advises a complete substantive fusion of law and
equity, the question remains whether such fusion can be achieved short of the
total codification of Anglo-American law. Lord Evershed thinks not. 13 The same
point is implicit in Dean Pound's remark that our nineteenth century procedural
10 Text at 51.
11 Siess v. Anderson, 159 Mo. App. 656, 139 S.W. 1178, 1179 (1911).
12 E.g., Text at 188.
13 Evershed, Equity after Fusion, 1 JouR. OF THE Soc. OF PUB. TEACHERS
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reforms "came too soon."'14 One may debate whether complete codification is desirable, possible, or practicable. Our system is the child of case-law, owing little
of its inner spirit or genius to codification. Indeed the very systems which Professor Newman rates as superior to the Anglo-American system are codified. One
may therefore question the validity of conclusions drawn from a comparison of
systems so essentially different in their origins, traditions, and techniques.
Professor Newman realizes that through human law only an approximate approach to ideal justice is possible. 1 5 Like all commodities, codification has its price.
Similarly, a price must be paid for our uncodified system of case law. Each system
has its peculiar values. Some may think that for us the price of codification may
come too high.
Nevertheless, through a tedious but steady process, our courts, still operating
under a regime of separation of substantive law and equity, have power to develop common law substantive rules with greater approximation to ideal justice.
What sovereign decree prevents them from picking up the threads of equity dropped
by the common law judges of five centuries ago? Lord Mansfield may have failed
to exorcise the doctrine of consideration in Pillans v. Van Mierop'6 ; however, he
succeeded in creating new frontiers for quasi-contract in Moses v. Mac Ferlan 1 7.
Legislation, slowly supplementing the traditional case-by-case technique, and remedying "what flaws may lurk" therein is still possible and fruitful. " The demands
of order, of certainty, of predictability - not the least of the desiderataof a system
of justice according to law - may suggest that for us the complete substantive
fusion of law and equity through total codification would not be an unmixed
benefit. The Rule of Law cannot become a law without rules.
Nevertheless our history shows that equity and law were not parted by a
divorce a vinculo and perhaps the old anecdote of Lord Chancellor More has
its own deeper symbolism:
Whensoever he passed through Westminster Hall to his place in the
Chancery by the Court of the King's Bench, if his father, one of the judges
thereof, had been sat ere he came, he would go into the same Court and
there reverently kneeling down in the sight of them all, duly ask his father's
blessing. 19
Edward F. Barrett*
LIFE, DEATH, AND THE LAW. By Norman St. John-Stevas. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1961, $5.95. This book is about law and morality. The
precise object of inquiry is whether and to what extent the public law, particularly
the criminal law, should uphold and give penal sanction to moral standards of
behavior. The law in the book is Anglo-American, with some small reference to
continental codes; the morality is Christian, though this must be said rather broadly,
because of sharp controversy over the moral issues, principally between Catholics
and Protestants and liberal Protestants. The author himself is a Catholic, an
English lawyer and legal scholar in his very early thirties. He shows legal prudence
and wisdom extraordinary in a man so young. His analysis of the pertinent literature
legal, theological, and sociological - is thorough, unpretentious, and clear. His
recommendations are fair-minded, objective, and practical. The book is an allaround excellent one: cogent, clear, and rationally persuasive, in controversial
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matters in which some other writing, perhaps of partisan religionists, has been
fuzzy-minded, strident, and doctrinaire.
Law and morality are different from each other. Law looks to external order
and public peace. The sanctions of law are external and public. Intention has no
significance in law unless it is carried out in the overt act. Morality, on the other
hand, is interior in both aim and sanction; the interior act, in quality and intention,
has ruling moral importance even anterior to, or apart from, its external performance. If there is overlap between the two - and it is known that there is - this
is because in a given society some "sin" is also seen as a "crime!': an offense so
harmful to public order and civil peace as to require the external sanctions of law
as well as the inner condemnation of conscience. Examples, still operative even in
our pluralist society, are murder, rape, theft, etc.
But Mr. St. John-Stevas' book deals with six forms of activity which have a
lot of law and morality connected with them, but which do not now receive the
same unanimous moral condemnation that we still accord to murder and rape.
These are: contraception, artificial insemination, homosexuality, suicide, sterilization, and euthanasia. All of these are covered in Anglo-American law, mostly in
the criminal law either by way of prohibition or regulation, but most of them also
have consequences in the civil law, in questions of annulment and divorce, inheritance, administrative law, and actions for damages. And clearly these activities
are in the law by reason of sin, by reason of a former moral condemnation. AngloAmerican law is based on a Christian moral code which not too long ago enjoyed
an assumed or real commonness of theoretical assent, but which is now in dispute,
not only between Christians and secularists, but also among Christians themselves.
The theoretical community is now absent, but the laws remain. At no time did the
law attempt to make all sins crimes. But the law has intervened, in one way or
another, in the six forms of activity covered in Mr. St. John-Stevas' book; and
here controversy lies, on the moral grounds which in the first instance gave rise
to the laws.
Controversy lies mainly between the Catholics on one side and all other parties
on the other. In an introductory chapter Mr. St. John-Stevas analyzes briefly the
basic division, in theory and history, that separates Catholics and Protestants in
the question of law and morality. From the beginning of the split, Catholics and
Protestants differed on the two questions of the origin of moral duty and on the
nature and function of the state. Catholics saw moral duty as contained in and
required by nature, particularly the nature of man. Human nature was harmed,
but not destroyed, by sin. Human reason is capable of coming to an adequate
knowledge of nature's structure and laws; and the law of human nature, or the
moral law, consists in man's duty to fulfill nature as rationally known by reason.
Along with Catholic optimism over nature and reason went a positive theory of
the state. Since man is by nature a social animal, the state is a product of nature,
and, since natural, good. The state would have existed apart from sin and regardless of sin. In a sinless society the state would have existed to put organization
and structure into virtuous activity. Against this background, it is to be expected
that Catholic thought would have assigned a positive function to the state to make
and execute laws furthering the ends of nature and promoting the common good
of man.
In Protestant thought, nature was corrupted by sin, and human reason therefore corrupted along with the rest of nature. Nature and reason are not only inadequate but completely untrustworthy norms of moral conduct. Good moral conduct consists in getting out of nature, rising above it, not following sinful reason
as a norm, but exercising personal liberty with faith in Christ. And the state itself
is the product of sin, suffused in sin, utterly incapable of providing moral direction
and virtuous leadership for its citizens.
Such is the background of the controversy. The development since has not
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been consistent by any means. For example, it was Protestant activity, not Catholic,
that originally put into the public law many of these morals-based laws that some
Catholics now strive to uphold, while Protestants and others want them out. The
emergence of a new Protestant orthodoxy has tended to widen the split in some
respects, while opening the way to more understanding discussion in others. The
theoretical cleavage on law and morals gives the explanation of much of the irritation and resentment between Catholics and Protestants in these matters. Protestants
resent Catholic attempts to lay down the moral law for everybody else. The Catholic
claim that the moral law as interpreted by the Catholic Church is universal and not
sectarian irritates Protestants endlessly. Catholics, conversely, are bewildered and
annoyed by the absence of body and principle, and by the personalist and changeable character, of Protestant moral theology. And Catholics resent the lining-up
of Protestants and secularists on the same side of many questions where Catholics
think solid human values are endangered.
The chapters of Mr. St. John-Stevas' book attempt to establish and apply
principles and guide-lines to aid the law in this touchy matter of legislating morality.
The law should bear in mind its outer-directedness towards public order and external peace. Thus prohibition of private homosexual activity between consenting
adult males, for instance, should go out of the criminal law. Again, public law in
moral matters requires a "moral consensus," in the absence of which groups 5hould
refrain from pushing for laws as part of a power struggle in which the moral issue
itself tends to get lost. The Catholic side of the contraception issue no longer enjoys
a moral consensus, and the Catholic body in, for example, Massachusetts and
Connecticut has no right to enforce its view through public law. However, though
moral consensus may be lacking in a portion of an issue, it may be present or at
least possibly present in another portion. Thus Catholics, abandoning the struggle
for legal prohibition of contraception, may still rightly press for legislation against
advertising, sale to unmarried minors, sale from slot-machines, and provisions for
contraception in foreign-aid programs. Whether a moral consensus exists as to a
given issue should be determined by peaceful democratic processes. No group should
attempt to use naked power, but rational persuasion only. Mr. St. John-Stevas suggests that the Catholic legislators of Connecticut might, for a change, turn their
attention towards the state's compulsory sterilization law, just as much against
Catholic morals as contraception, and discover if they might find a moral consensus
for the repeal of that.
No side is favored in Mr. St. John-Stevas' book. Catholic intransigence has
placed the Catholic Church in the unwelcome, unrewarding, and ultimately impractical role of watchdog of everybody's conscience. But Protestant and liberal Protestant relativism, personalism, opportunism, changing with the times, joining up
with anybody, place Protestants under a strong necessity of coming to some decision
as to where, morally, they stand. Short of bloody murder, there seems now to be
almost no manifestation of human behavior that does not find some ministers and
others willing not only to condone and permit, but enthusiastically to support and
sign petitions for. Besides the Catholic and Protestant, other positions, secularistliberal and utilitarian, receive review and criticism in this book.
Life, Death, and the Law is a truly didactic book, in the best sense of that word.
It teaches, and the reader learns from it. It is full of good law, good moral theology,
and good sociology and criticism. It is clear, cogent, and persuasive throughout its
development, arguments, and recommendations.
Charles E.Sheedy, C.S.C.
THE PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES. Edited by Ren6 Wormser.
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1958, the Practicing Law Institute held a two-day session in New York City
during the course of which the affairs of a hypothetical client, Androcles Simpson,
were analyzed by two successive panels of outstanding experts in the field of
estate planning and administration before a gathering of six hundred practicing
lawyers from all parts of the nation. The first panel, consisting of William J. Casey,
W. T. Hackett, Robert J. Lawthers, Merle H. Miller, Peter Miller, William B.
Murray, Norman A. Sugarman and James F. Thornburg, under its moderator,
Ren6 A. Wormser, discussed the planning of Mr. Simpson's estate. The second
panel, consisting of Kingsbury Browne, Jr., Bernard V. Lentz, Joseph W. Price,
3rd., Martin F. Shea, Jr., Lloyd George Soll, William K. Stevens and Eustace
W. Tomlinson, under its moderator, Henry Cassorte Smith, tackled the problems
of administrating Mr. Simpson's estate after his convenient but "untimely" death.
These panel discussions were recorded and were subsequently edited and supplemented by Mr. Wormser. The result is a publication which is a unique contribution to the materials available to the practicing attorney, which so frequently are
unimaginative in their approach to legal problems in the area of estate planning
techniques.
In his preface, Mr. Wormser states that "of the various ways of learning more
about estate planning and administration, I believe the panel method to be the
most rewarding." For those who have never had the good fortune to have attended
any of the many panel performances which have been conducted under the direction and moderation of Mr. Wormser in the past, this modus operandi will
open new vistas of methods, approach and judgment in handling the tax, property
and human problems of estate planning, and they are certain to agree that the
panel method is "most rewarding." For those who have been fortunate enough to
have been present during such a panel discussion, this book will be extremely
welcome since it now affords the reader the opportunity to sit down in leisure and
private seclusion to meditate and ponder the many interesting and fascinating
aspects of estate planning and administration which are raised by these outstanding panels.
Each panel deals in clinical fashion, on an advanced level, with typical estate
planning and administration problems (although the solutions suggested are not
always typical), and, therefore, a rudimentary knowledge in this field is presumed.
Thus, this book is not designed for the novice except to the extent that it makes
him aware of the areas in which his knowledge may be insufficient - and, everything else to the contrary notwithstanding, ignorance is not always bliss.
The discussion of each panel is based on stated facts which were distributed
in advance to the audience and which are set forth in detail in the book. Naturally,
the affairs of Mr. Simpson, his assets and his personal family problems, are extremely complex in order to present sufficient opportunity for the panel to analyze
a wide range of specific problems, make recommendations and indicate how to
implement such recommendations. Mr. Simpson's net taxable estate for federal
estate tax purposes is approximately $1,500,000.00, with a wide variety of assets
including a cabin cruiser, stamp collection, real estate in New York, Florida and
Louisiana, listed securities, complete ownership of a closely held corporation, life
insurance, a vested remainder interest in a testamentary trust created by his grandfather, and a power of appointment in a testamentary trust created by his father.
Mr. Simpson's family problems are equally imposing. He has a second wife who
is an ideal companion and mother, but who is completely inadequate in financial
matters. He has a son by his first wife, who is in very poor health, five children by
his second wife, one of whom is definitely retarded, an orphan grandchild, and an
aged mother-in-law in failing health. Here is a client who should be welcomed with
open arms by the practicing attorney.
Each member of the first panel is an expert in the field of taxation and much
of the discussion necessarily centers around tax considerations since every phase
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of Mr. Simpson's estate is affected by this aspect of the law. However, the principal
objective of the panel is to provide an estate plan which, in the words of the
editor, will open the client's eyes "to exciting and intriguing prospects - not
merely for tax savings but, more importantly, for creating an effective and sound
plan related to the persons whose welfare should dictate the objectives." This
objective permeates the entire discussion and the panelists themselves frequently
caution one another that they may be losing sight of primary objectives when, in
their eagerness, they may have struck upon a new concept or a new idea which
will eliminate cash from the coffers of Uncle Sam. For example, midway through
the proceedings of the first panel, Mr. Murray issued such a warning when the
panel appeared to have agreed upon a form of buy-sell agreement between Mr.
Simpson and Lion Mfg. Corp., of which he was the majority stockholder. In order
to make certain that the redemption of the deceased stockholder's interest in the
corporation did not constitute a constructive dividend, a suggestion was made
that there should be no tie-in between the buy-sell agreement and the obligation
of the corporation to carry insurance on the life of Mr. Simpson; to which point
Mr. Murray took exception in the following statement:
That brings up other considerations, as distinguished from the tax
factors. If you drop the buy-and-sell agreement, the majority shareholders
can have the insurance collected, pay themselves big salaries, use the money

to buy a new plant, etc., while the widow screams for action and the estate

stock remains unliquidated. It becomes a question whether you
take some risk in using a buy-and-sell agreement or lay yourself
frustration through the other shareholders' recalcitrance.
I have never believed that tax considerations should govern
I think we must consider, carefully whether, in being too anxious
any possible tax risk, we are failing to protect our client.'

wish to
open to

entirely.
to avoid

Thus, this book is much more than just a tax handbook in the field of estate
planning. It is a practical treatise which interrelates all phases of estate planning
in broad perspective.
Two basic and integrated themes pervade the discussion of the first panel.
The first theme is liquidity. Will there be sufficient liquid assets at Mr. Simpson's
death to pay all debts, administration expenses and death taxes? If not, what are
some of the methods by which additional liquid assets can be made available or,
in the alternative, what are some of the methods of reducing the amount of liquid
assets necessary at his death?
The first and most obvious solution is the full utilization of the marital deduction which will reduce the federal estate tax at death and thereby reduce the
amount of liquid assets required at that time. What is the best method of capturing the maximum marital deduction? Is it wise to give Mrs. Simpson the right
to withdraw principal from the so-called marital deduction trust? What about
protecting her from the "swami" by giving her, instead, a power of appointment
exercisable only at her death? Or should the wife have the right to consume capital
from the marital deduction trust, with income from both trusts going to the children (who will be taxed at a lower rate), protecting the widow with a "sprinkling"
clause in the non-marital deduction trust which authorizes the trustee to distribute
income among a designated group, including the wife. These questions, and many
others pertaining to the use of the marital deduction, are considered and discussed
in detail by the panel.
Another mechanism for providing liquidity at death is the use of gifts during
life. The advantages are considered and discussed by the panel, viz.: the privilege
of split-gifts made with the consent of a spouse; the annual exclusion of $3,000.00
per person; the life time exemption of $30,000.00; the fact that the gift tax rates
are lower than the estate tax rate and, consequently, in making the comparison,
the estate tax rate must be established by superimposing the fund in question
1 Text at 63.
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on the rest of the estate, while, in computing the gift tax, the rates which apply
are those reached by superimposing the fund only on gifts already made. The
danger of a gift in "contemplation of death" is considered and suggestions are
made as to how to mitigate this element of risk.
Next, the panel reviews the intriguing possibilities for estate tax diminution
through gifts to charitable institutions. The savings in estate tax resulting from
a testamentary gift is apparent since the gift is deductible from the gross estate.
However, if the gift is made during the lifetime of the donor, there are multiple
tax savings since the income taxes are saved during life and the property is not
included in the estate of the donor at his death. One particular form of lifetime
gift to charity which protects the ultimate beneficiaries of the donor is a charitable
term trust by which the donor gives the income rights for a term of years to the
charity with the remainder to the members of the family. This increases the current cash position of the donor because the actuarial value of the interest given
to charity is currently deductible and a deferred gift is made only on the value
of the remainder interest. Depending upon the tax bracket of the donor, it is
actually possible to make money on some term trust gifts to charity.
The reverse kind of charitable trust also has terrific potentialities. In this type
of trust, the remainder goes to charity and the life interest is reserved to the donor.
The donor can use appreciated securities for the trust, and, if there is compliance
with- Revenue Ruling 60-3701 they can be converted into tax-exempt bonds by
the trustee without paying capital gain on the appreciation of the converted 5ecurities, since the capital gain is chargeable to the charitable remainder interest
and is tax free. Thus, the donor receives an income tax deduction for the remainder
interest, computed at the appreciated value of the securities placed in trust, plus
a conversion without capital gain, and he receives tax-exempt income during his
life. Since the donor retains a life income in the trust, the value of the trust at
his death will be included in the gross estate. However, the then value of the
charitable remainder will be deductible from the gross estate and, in addition, the
estate will be entitled to the maximum marital deduction. In other words, the
marital deduction is determined without reference to the charitable deduction.
In the same manner, the panel considers other methods of solving the liquidity
problem, viz.: the obtention of more insurance if the client is still insurable, possible conversion of existing policies, change of beneficiary designations on policies
so as to obtain the maximum marital deduction, gifts of insurance policies, either
in trust or directly, sale of assets during life or, by a buy-sell agreement, after death
(with special regard to Sections 302, 303 and 306 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954) and the use of United States savings bonds purchased at a discount
for estate taxes under Section 632 of the 1954 Code.
The second theme is the general consideration of the client's objectives. The
preservation of the family enterprise is high on the list of Mr. Simpson's objectives and, because the problem of management succession is important, there is
a detailed consideration of deferred compensation, both qualified and non-qualified
plans, including long-term employment contracts, pension and profit-sharing plans,
stock options and stock bonus plans. Through the maximum use of the advantages offered by such plans, the client can do much to obtain qualified executives and subsequently retain their loyalty. By tying the executive to the business
through one or more of these plans which create self-interest, greater loyalty can
be assured after the proprietor's death.
Another objective of the client is the establishment of plans which will pro2 Revenue Ruling 60-370, 1960 Int. Rev. Bull. No. , at holds that the donor
would be taxable with capital gains realized upon the disposition of the appreciated property
by the trustee, if the trust instrument required the trustee to make such sale or if such an
obligation were implied from all of the surrounding facts, notwithstanding an absence of
mandate to sell in the trust instrument itself.
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vide for specific beneficiaries. The use of the short term or so-called "Clifford"
trust is considered in detail as a mechanism which will accommodate such beneficiaries as the children, grandchildren and aging mother-in-law. This type of trust
will protect the client since he will have the reversionary interest, and yet it will
provide temporary benefits to specified individuals with a consequent reduction
of income taxes since the income will not be taxed to the settlor but will be taxed
to the beneficiaries who will be in a lower income tax bracket.
Specific plans are considered for the protection of the incompetent son, the
ailing son and the daughter-in-law (the "forgotten woman"). The problem of
guardianship of the "person" of the minor children is discussed and specific recommendations are made.
As previously indicated, the second panel assumes the death of Mr. Simpson
and then considers the myriad problems created by the administration of his
estate. It is impossible to review in detail the specific problems considered by the
second panel, but from the size and scope of Mr. Simpson's estate as set forth
above, it should be easy for the reader to imagine the complexities facing the
persons responsible for administrating the estate. These problems are given the
same comprehensive treatment as that which was given to the planning of the
estate by the first panel.
Neither panel attempts to provide ready-made solutions for ready-made
problems. In fact, the experts frequently do not agree among themselves. However, the book does provide an endless supply of ideas and imaginative techniques
from which the practicing attorney can benefit immensely.
We would be remiss if we did not point out the fact that humor and spontaneity are essential ingredients of the panel method. In the midst of a very serious
discussion about the Treasury Regulations which provide, that where a grandparent establishes a "support" trust for a grandchild, the income of the trust is
taxable to the parent to the extent it is used for reasonable support, Mr. Murray
reports the reaction of a very wealthy grandfather whose daughter was divorced
by a ne'er-do-well son-in-law:
"Fine. We will give Fifty Thousand Dollars a year to these children. We
will bankrupt my son-in-law."3

Perhaps such comments are the real reason why Mr. Wormser considers the panel
method to be "most rewarding."
Edward J. Gray*
THE TAx PRACTCE DESKBOoKc. By Harrop A. Freeman and Norman D.
Freeman. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960. Pp. xx, 581. $17.50.
The schoolboy whips his taxed top; the beardless youth manages his
taxed horse with a taxed bridle on a taxed road; and the dying Englishman, pouring his medicine, which has paid seven per cent, into a spoon
that has paid fifteen per cent, flings himself back upon his chintz bed
which has paid twenty-two per cent, and expires in the arms of an apothecary who has paid a license of a hundred pounds for the privilege of
putting him to death.'

If any area of the law can be said to cut across all other areas, it is tax law.
The ability to deal quickly and efficiently with tax matters is no longer important
to the tax specialist alone, but to every attorney and businessman. Two members
of the New York Bar have made a valuable contribution to the literature of this
pervasive subject. Calling upon 25 years of tax practice and 15 years of tax
teaching, Harrop A. Freeman and Norman D. Freeman have attempted a comprehensive study of the procedural aspects of tax matters. They have singled out
3
*

Text at 142.
B.S., LL.B., Notre Dame; member of the Indiana Bar.

1 Text at 4.
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the procedural phase of tax law because, in their own words, "Attention can be
focused on the real tax questions far better if tax practice is so smoothly and
knowingly followed that procedural errors do not divert attention."2
In their preface the authors address their book to the general legal practitioner,
the accountant, the tax specialist, the student, and the businessman.3 However,
since the authors frequently assume that their readers possess legal training, the
book's usefulness to accountants and businessmen might be somewhat limited,
although parts are of benefit to non-lawyers.
Much of the material in the book is likely to be second nature to tax specialists; but it will be a helpful tool even to the expert; it could be the starting point
for researching every tax case. Needless to say, if the book can be so important to
a man who often handles tax matters, it can be doubly important to the general
practitioner and the tax student. It provides all the answers for the general practitioner handling routine tax problems and warns him when his case is so involved
that a specialist should be consulted. The student will find good use for the book
in supplementing the knowledge of substantive tax law that he acquires in his
regular taxation courses.
The authors take a dual approach to their subject. Basically they use a "Hornbook" style, interspersed with bits of personal hints and opinions through which
the authors share their own tax experience.
This book is a comprehensive legal treatise. The exhaustive treatment of tax
procedure law is supplemented by enough substantive tax law to enable the practitioner to get a good start on any tax research from one book. The authors also
discuss other areas of the law such as the Federal Rules, estoppel, and res judicata.
However, they avoid making their approach too broad; they limit consideration
of these matters to their application to tax cases.
The law of tax procedure is treated in a framework which explains the different steps through which a tax problem may proceed- from preparing a return
to arguing an appeal. Throughout the book, the authors list the alternatives a
taxpayer has at each level of a tax case and present the requirements for an adequate
approach to the problem. If there is a minority view on a particular problem
the authors are careful to bring it forth. They seldom review the reasoning
which supports such a second line of authority, but, by comprehensive footnoting,
supply instead a starting point for the researcher interested in complete coverage.
When the authors need.to illustrate a point, they need not call upon X or Y
or Blackacre, but instead can cite actual cases they have handled. They are able
to tell the reader what they have found to be the attitude of the Internal Revenue
Service and the Tax Court; they remind practitioners to watch certain cases now
pending in courts; they point out what they feel are the current trends in the law.
When the law is unsettled on a particular point, they give their opinions on what
the law appears to be and advise the reader on what they think should be done
if a case involving the point must be handled.
Frequent check lists are another major attraction. These lists resemble those
which every careful practitioner draws up from experience to save himself time
when handling subsequent cases. Mention has already been made of the lists of
alternatives at various stages of the taxation process. There are also check lists
designed to prevent any omissions or common errors in handling specific types of
problems and proceedings.
Chapter I is entitled "General Tax Practice." The theory of tax practice,
procedural choices, and qualifications for admission to practice before the Treasury
Department and the Tax Court are discussed. There is also an introduction to
the research tools of tax practice and how to use them. It is important for one
2 Id. at vi.
3 Id. atv.
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who has not done much tax work to become acquainted with the last part of this
chapter, since the extensive footnoting of specialized tax law sources which marks
the rest of the book requires considerable familiarity with these sources.
The second chapter, "Preventive Tax Practice," contains tips on conducting a
business in order to avail oneself of tax advantages-a full discussion of preparing returns, ranging from corporate income to estate tax. The authors explain how to get
federal and state tax rulings, and the values of such rulings to the preventive tax
practitioner. Finally the authors discuss what records a taxpayer should keep.
The first of the check lists in this section is a compilation of the advantages and
disadvantages of filing a consolidated return; 4 the second is a list of the tax duties
of an executor or administrator. 5
6
The next chapter is on facts -how to get them, and how to prove them. It
begins with a check list' of steps and the practitioner should take in discovering and
organizing his facts, which is expanded and analyzed later in the chapter. 8 There
are copious illustrations. 9
Chapter IV concerns the organization, policies, attitudes, powers, and procedures of the Internal Revenue Service, including IRS policy on the publicity of
tax returns, one of a series of discussions of attitudes and policies of the IRS
toward taxpayers.' 0 There is also a simplified chart showing the internal procedure
of the department in income tax disputes."
The fifth chapter, "Deficiencies and Overassessments," begins by continuing
the discussion of the Internal Revenue Service. The pre-decision procedures, the
auditing process, the 30-day letter, the Appellate Division, and the 90-day letter
are all treated. The authors discuss the alternatives open to the taxpayer and how
overassessments should be handled. There are three very useful charts at the
beginning of the chapter: on the processing of income tax returns from the taxpayer to the Supreme Court;' 2 on the flow of tax cases; and on the taxpayer's
alternatives at the various stages. 13 The authors draw upon their experience to
provide some hints on how to negotiate and compromise with the Internal Revenue
Service,'1 4 and how to treat a field auditor. 5

The Tax Court is the subject of the next chapter and the discussion begins
with an explanation of its organization and its jurisdiction. Tax Court petitions,
answers, and replies are treated, as are pre-hearing, hearing, and post-hearing procedures. Rules of evidence, burden of proof, and brief requirements are among the
other subjects discussed. The authors use a Tax Qourt petition to illustrate its
form and content.' 6
The chapter on the Department of Justice explains its organization and its
treatment of civil, criminal, and appellate tax cases. Chapter VIII, "Refunds,"
includes a discussion of pre-court refund procedure, as well as how and by whom
suit may be brought. The authors outline the considerations which should be
weighed in choosing one's forum and then explain tax practice in the district courts
and in the Court of Claims. There is a long check list to help the reader fulfill all
the requirements of a refund petition. The discussion of related procedural areas
4
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of the law (e.g., res judicata 7) is confined to their relation to tax law."'
The next chapter discusses appeal of tax cases from the Tax Court, from the
district courts, and from the Court of Claims. In the last section the authors comment on the sort of cases the Supreme Court has reviewed in the past and what it
is likely to review in the future. A convenient check list is provided for appealing
a Tax Court decision.
In Chapter X the procedural problems of limitations, estoppel, and res judicata
are fully considered. The problem of collection and enforcement is also discussed.
Three charts are used to summarize the statute of limitations provisions as they
apply to assessments and collections, refunds, and court proceedings. 19 Each 20chart
lists the limitations and provisions of both the 1954 and the 1939 Codes.
Penalty cases are the subject matter of the next chapter, which discusses fraud,
net worth, and criminal cases. The authors also advise as to compromise of penalty
cases. This chapter, like the one preceding, begins with charts, which list the civil
and criminal penalties provided for in the 1954 and 1939 Codes. 21 There is a final
diagram showing the administrative procedure in tax fraud cases.2 2 The final
chapter is "How to Brief a Tax Case." In it the authors adopt and explain the
Department of Justice's outline of a brief.
No book review can really do this work justice -it must be seen to be appreciated. It is the type of book that every man who handles tax matters ought to
have. Reference to it might well be the initial step in handling any tax case.
David T. Link*
INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: A Study in the Legal Implementation of
Social and Economic Public Policy. By Spencer L. Kimball. Madison; The University of Wisconsin Press, 1960. Pp. xii, 387. $7.50 (with full documentation);
$6.00 (regular edition). This study of one state's development in the field of insurance law is an ambitious undertaking to relate a "part of the story of American insurance law."' In the preface, the author notes the volume of material available to the researcher and concludes that the best course is to deal fully with
the development of insurance law in one state, "leaving wider generalizations for
the future. ' 2 The selection of Wisconsin as the state to be studied, instead of a
more prominent state such as New York, is defended as a choice of a state more
typical of the general American growth. This reviewer remained unconvinced
throughout the book that the unique experience of Progressivism did not render
the state extraordinary.

The research for this study was done under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, as one of similar inquiries into "legal history" in Wisconsin. As interpreted in the larger program of which this is a part,
legal history is not a narrowly conceived study of the antiquities of
technical legal doctrine, but is an investigation into the interplay of law
and society - into the legal implementation of social and economic public
policy3

Within the framework of this purpose, the author's undertaking is twofold,
as the title suggests: first, the material object, the history of insurance law in
17
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* 1961 graduate, Notre Dame Law School; Teaching Fellow in Accounting, College
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terms of relevant legal materials, is to be recounted; and secondly, the formal
object, the development of insurance law as an integral part of the expression
of public policy, is advanced as a thesis to be developed and proven.
The author's treatment of the history is admirable, both for its completeness
and for its intelligibility. The more complete documentation is contained appendixfashion as 40 extra pages in the special edition, but the omission of these does
not seriously impair the value of the story to be told since the text is partially
annotated. The actual arrangement of the subject is dictated by the formal object, but as a proper historian, the author preserves internal objectivity in the
narration.
Following a general introductory section, the structure of the book is as follows: "Validation of the Insurance Enterprise"; "Creation of an Adequate Insurance Fund"; "Protecting the Integrity of the Insurance Fund against Dissipation"; "The Administration of Claims"; "The Distribution of the Fund"; "Insurance
in the Larger Society"; and "Conclusions." The treatment of the relations between public policy and the insurance business is historical, but the arrangement
is logical rather than chronological, "logical as considered from the vantage point
of the business rather than from that of the conceptual framework of the law." 4
The writer takes the point of view that the law takes its initial premises. from
the life of society outside the law and it ultimately justifies legal decisions in
terms of social goals and moral standards. As a result insurance is viewed as an
aspect of the life of society, and insurance law as an expression of public policy.
This approach enables the author to write much more than a history of insurance, as indeed this work demonstrates, while limiting the documentation to
the appropriate insurance data. However, since this work does not purport to
present a consistent theory of history, it should not be condemned on that score,
but its conclusions could be questioned by one whose particular historical views
conflict with the basic assumptions of the author.
In a section discussing insurance law as reflective of public policy, the author
correctly states that in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the prevailing
legislative and judicial attitudes were sympathetic to the growth of industrial and
financial capitalism, although it is doubtful that the growth of capitalism was
that uppermost in the mind of the common man.
In the field of insurance, and of commercial law generally, the most important component of this complex of attitudes was the notion that the

free will of contracting parties should be given complete effect - that freedom to make contracts included freedom to make oppressive contracts.
This attitude was embodied in articulated legal doctrine, and thus remained effective as a conservative factor in the judge-made law of
insurance long after the extreme nineteenth-century forms of the philosophy that produced it had ceased to control community opinion.5

Since elsewhere in this book insurance law is interpreted as the conscious expression of public policy, (e.g. the anti-charter policy of the early nineteenth century is viewed as an expression of Jacksonian democracy),6 -n interpretation that
the conservative judges of the period were merely rationalizing unjust results can
be justified. If this be so, the moral worth of much of the common law of insurance is drawn into question. But what is more startling, those judges are being
labelled judicial activists in an age where passivism was almost militant.
In the concluding chapter the author interprets the materials so painstakingly accumulated in the earlier pages, to confirm his basic thesis. The reader may
take issue with some of the judgement therein, such as "In the field of insurance
law, dogma rarely inhibits growth, for in the long run the persistent pressure of
4 Text at 5.
5 Id. at 302.
6 Id. at 66.
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society's needs generally overcame the toughest doctrine," or with the author's
choice of words calling insurance a public utility or viewing it as a means of
socializing the risks of enterprise or the ordinary activities of daily life.
This work does not avoid what it stated it was going to avoid: the wider
generalizations. In fact there is some conclusion inherent in typifying Wisconsin
as an ordinary state in the matter of insurance law. That the state of Wisconsin
was chosen by the Rockefeller Foundation for special investigation is some indication that it is not "Middlestate." But the conclusion that this is truly a significant
contribution to the field of legal history is equally unavoidable. And its utility will
not be limited to the state of Wisconsin.
Gerald M. Gallivan
IT'S THE LAW. By Bernard Tomson. New York: Channel Press, Inc., 1960.
Pp. xi, 436. $7.50. Bernard Tomson is an authority and an articulate commentator
on architectural law. The present volume was developed from Mr. Tomson's
monthly column in the Progressive Architect, a noted architectural journal. Mr.
Tomson has been a lawyer for 25 years and is at present a judge in the Nassau
County District Court of New York.
The author's aim is to compile a reference guide to the basic legal problems
facing the architect, engineer, or contractor. Although each area dealt with is
treated in a separate chapter, Tomson divides his book into five parts. Part 1
deals with the statutes regulating the practice of architecture, engineering and
building construction. In this section, the author recommends uniform licensing
requirements in order to create a standard of high level professional competence.'
In Part 2 Tomson discusses the organization and business problems facing the
architectural firm. After a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of
partnerships and corporations, he recommends the partnership as the most flexible,
workable form. The remaining chapters in Part 2 are brief essays on fees, ethical
restraint on fee-splitting,3 construction bids,4 performance bonds,5 and building
codes. Part 3 is entitled The Employment Relation. The three chapters comprising
this section are the heart of the book. Under this broad heading Mr. Tomson treats
areas which are vital to architect, engineer, and contractor- such recurring problems as the content of the construction contract, the role of the architect in controlling the interaction between owner, contractor, and sub-contractor, use of arbitration in contract disputes, and the power of the government "contracting officer"
in construing construction contracts are all included in the discussion. The fourth
part is entitled Rights and Liabilities of Architects, Engineers, and Contractors;
contained are capsule summaries of the law in such distinct areas as mechanics'
liens,7 specific performance," negligent performance, liability insurance, 10 and defamation of architects." The fifth and final part concerns restrictions on the use
of property. Mr. Tomson devotes a chapter to restrictive covenants, zoning ordinances, and the role of esthetics in zoning regulation. It is not until this final

7 Id. at 314.
1 Text at 26. "[Ilt is apparent that a 'uniform' statute would be of considerable aid to
state groups of architects seeking an effective licensing law."
2 Id. at 66.
3 Id. at 80.
4 Id. at 94.
5 Id. at 110.
6 Id. at 125.
7 Id. at 230.
8 Id. at 276.
9 Id. at 245.
10 Id. at 272.
11 Id. at 239.
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chapter, dealing with esthetics, that the author deviates from his straight expository
approach. Following an extensive discussion of the landmark case of Berman v.
Parker,12 Mr. Tomson advocates an increased recognition of esthetics as a legitimate
basis of zoning regulation. He reasons that such recognition will raise the status
of the architect in his role as a community planner.13
Each of the preceding parts is followed by a collection of "miscellaneous decisions" pertaining to topics discussed in the chapters. The final 75 pages are given
to an appendix of standard forms used by the American Institute of Architects.
It's the Law is not a legal reference book. The legal problems considered are
given a superficial and simplified treatment. The book is sparsely annotated and
an overly large share of the cited cases are New York decisions. The reader cannot
quarrel with the author's reasoning, nor can he take issue with his conclusions,
since Mr. Tomson limits his treatment to existing law; he does not analyze or
predict. The suggestions he makes regarding uniform licensing requirements
and the increased use of esthetics as a basis of zoning regulation stand out as
isolated statements of opinion.' 4
The topics are treated in individual essays and, as a result, the book lacks
continuity. The connection between some of the chapters in a given section is
often tenuous. This could prove distracting to a person reading the book in its
entirety and not using it solely as a reference text. The lack of cohesion is explained
to a large extent by the fact that a good many of these chapters were drawn from
separate articles in the Progressive Architect.
In spite of, (perhaps because of), its legal shortcomings, It's the Law may be
a valuable asset to an architect. Not only are the topics of interest, but the entire
volume is geared to acceptance and understanding by the layman. In his introduction the author states that his aim is to aid the architect in making him able to
recognize, not solve, legal problems which arise in his profession.'- This desire is
underscored by constant reminders that when serious legal problems arise, the
architect had best contact a lawyer. By abandoning heavy citation and leaving
a large share of the case discussion to the "miscellaneous decisions" sections following
each part, and by avoiding unnecessary use of unfamiliar legal terms, the author
sets out a clear exposition of legal principles. The forms section at the conclusion
of the text is another attractive feature, especially if one does not normally have
access to these AIA standard forms.
Despite the lack of annotation, It's the Law never falls into legal inaccuracy.
Because of its simplicity and clarity, the book ought to be a helpful handbook for
the architect whose work brings him in contact with legal problems.
I James K. Stucko
SPACE-AGE SUNDAY. By HILEY H. Ward. New York: The Macmillan Company,
1960. Pp. 160. $3.95. In December, the United States Supreme Court heard oral
argument in two cases, one from a three-judge federal district court in Massachusetts which had struck down a Massachusetts Sunday law as unconstitutional
because it required a Jewish market to close on Sunday;' and one from a federal
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The ultimate impact of the Berman case cannot yet be measured. Nevertheless, esthetic values in commercial and residential housing can be expected
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BOOK REVIEWS
district court in Pennsylvania, which upheld a Pennsylvania Sunday closing law.2
In late November, Space-Age Sunday, was published. The author, the present
Religion Editor of the Detroit Free Press, adeptly describes the stage for this mid20th century Sunday law conflict, and then he pointedly announces to the reader
his timely message:
And while all appearances would indicate that the causative factors
[of this Sunday law conflict] are the new socioeconomic forces, the real
main factor is the obstacle of an unadaptable church tradition.3

The book can roughly be divided into five subparts. In the first, the author
describes the Sunday law conflict and then, in a very scholarly two chapters, he
gives the origin and the rationale for Sunday laws. In the third part, he directly
attacks the rationale. In the last chapters, Mr. Ward, a Baptist scholar and author,
proposes an approach for "the church," 4 and for the individual, the one harmed
by this conflict. His closing discussion, "Sunday and Deeper Levels of Faith," results
in an instructive religious philosophy for the space-age Christian.
A traditional day of rest, according to the author, is indispensable for the
non-churchgoer, 5 but not for the Christian. The reason is that the Christian is
more adaptable to another schedule, and he is adaptable because he makes a
distinction between the different kinds of rest. The author then gives an analysis
of the trend in secular thought about physical rest. This informative analysis proceeds: bodily rest is relative, since no two people need the same amount; work
can be rest; tension, not a tranquilizer, can be restful; vacations can determine
the kind of rest; rest should be meaningful; and no absolute principle governs rest.
(No matter how correct the preceding observations are, it is submitted that there
is a minimum absolute principle concerning physical rest. This principle is that
all men need rest, even though each man's needs may vary as to the amount and
kind of rest. And the state under its police powers may provide for its citizens'
health, which includes their need for physical rest.)
Mr. Ward describes the religious origin of Sunday observance, juxtaposed to
the Sabbath observance by the Jews. But despite his rather accurate historical
understanding of the Babylonian (pre-Biblical) religious rest days, the Jewish
Sabbath, and the Eastern and African periodic religious days, the author posits
that state-enacted Sunday laws fail to achieve the goal of Sunday, a family rest
day. Is not the primary goal of Sunday observance, and its historic predecessors,
more than just a family rest day? Was not the primary goal of these days the
common or public observance of respect and adoration of the deity in pre-historic
times and of a monotheistic God in Biblical times? Are not all these historical facts
a sample of an innate need in man for special times for the public worship of God?7

2 Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 179 F. Supp. 944 (E.D.Pa.
1959).
3 Text at 14.
4 Throughout Space-Age Sunday, when the author speaks of "the church," he seems
to use this term in its broadest sense, to include all Christian denominations.
5 Text at 42.
The nonchurchgoer needs this church day . . . His philosophy dictates it

6

7

or feeds upon it, his philosophy of noninvolvement, of living a humdrum
existence. An advertising man was telling me recently when he flew to New
York from Chicago on business, if the business should carry over to Monday
the company always flew him home for the weekend and then back on
Monday. The day was that important.
Id. at 108, & n. 4:
By principle, we mean an absolute, unchanging idea or ideal; an external
criterion for evaluating the entire subjective and objective experience of
man. If a principle changes, then it is not a principle. Principle in this
book means that idea to which is ascribed metahistorical significance and
permanence.
ALoysIus ROCHE, APOLOGETICS FOR THE PULPIT 627-28 (1950).
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Is not Sunday the Lord's Day, a day when men gather together to honor God?8
If the Sunday observance is also to promote a family day of rest, is not the failure
of such laws to achieve this result partly due to the legislature's failure to modernize
their provisions and its failure to positively permit family activities? The author
attacks the Sunday laws,9 because of their anachronistic, outdated, and unenforced
provisions; he also decries their negation of family activities on Sunday, such as
sports and movies and food and drink in public places.' 0 Do not both of these defects in so many of the state statutes arise from incidental weaknesses of the laws,
which can be corrected, rather than from an inherent weakness in the idea of
Sunday closing laws?
The two most potent arguments of Space-Age Sunday against Sunday closing
laws are: that minority religions, such as Judaism, should not be ignored by the
state, which enacts religious observance laws; and that such laws are not in keeping
with the spirit of the Constitution. The author's latter argument is interesting, but
short. He notes three things about Sunday laws: that they confiscatorily deprive
people who worship on days other than Sunday of time which could be usefully
spent, by forcing on them a holy day which they do not observe; that they are
discriminatory against certain products, minority religions, and are susceptible to
inequitable enforcement;:" and that Sunday laws make the innocent criminal. The
author is legally mistaken in his understanding of the effect of the 14th amendment
on state statutes in the area of first amendment freedoms. He states:
The First Amendment says that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..."
But this has been construed to apply to Congress only. The states could
conceivably, by the right of state legislatures, make a law in a category
that Congress would not. This conflict was partially corrected after the
Civil War with the Fourteenth Amendment, which says that "no State

shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States." This corrects the situation
to a certain extent, but it does not bring the same limitation
2 of the First
Amendment of Congress to apply to the state legislatures.'

The privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment does not have
reference to fundamental, natural rights, such as the freedom of speech, but is concemed with rights arising from United States citizenship, such as the right to join
or not to join a labor union. 3 But the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has been held to apply the same guarantee of freedom of religion and separa4
tion of church and state to state statutes as is applied to federal legislation.1
In Chapter V, the author sets out to tell "the church," what to do in this
modem conflict to avoid its static, tradition-riddled approach to Sunday closing
laws and Sunday observance. The approach for religious bodies, he says, is to
compromise their positions on this Sunday law issue; to encourage novelty; and to
not assert principles as the guide to action even if the religious body insists on
recognizing principles. His point seems to be that a religious body will have the
most beneficial influence if it speaks "with jabs, quips, and not with invariable
principles."' 5 Undoubtedly, this solution is influenced by the author's theological
8 A CATHOLIC COMMENTARY ON HOLY SCRIPTURE, (Dom Bernard Orchard and
Associates, ed.) 812 (1953).
9 Text at 12:
Language changes contribute to the Sunday battle. Most Sunday laws are
clothed in archaic verbal garb. Yet states are hesitant to revise the language.
10 Id. at 93-94.
11 See note, 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 405, 429-30 (1960).
12 Text at 94-95.
13 Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 510-15 (1939); Slaugter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
14 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see Note,
35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 405, 407, n.5(1960).
15 Text at 114.
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orientation, but nonetheless, it is worth consideration by any spiritual adviser. But
a religious body, such as the Catholic Church, which feels and believes that its
primary duty is not only to advise man but to organize man's spiritual life,'0 cannot avoid proclaiming principles of the following sort to guide and organize man's
spiritual life: Sunday is a holy day and a day of rest.
The author suggests, if a single day is to be selected, that Friday, a day of
the cross, be selected. His proposal is unique and somewhat extreme, but it undoubtedly merits a reply from the various Christian sects. Sunday is not a worn-out
tradition, as the author would lead one to believe. He seems to use the word
"tradition" in a theological sense: and article or doctrine of religious practice that
has not been committed to writing. If this is his meaning, then it is not a tradition
with some religious bodies, such as the Catholic Church, which has codified its
observance of Sunday in its Canon Laws. 7 Certainly, if Sunday invites caricature,' 8
as the author also would lead one to believe, the answer is not to abrogate Sunday
observance, when it has an important function to perform. Sunday is an external,
sensible expression of a religious mystery, just as a national holiday is an expression
of national pride and feeling and meaning. Although such days sometimes are
eroded by commercialism - for example, Christmas - does that require the
abolition of the day and what it represents?
Space Age Sunday may be subject to question by theologians of various faiths.
Also, since the author devotes little time to the legality or constitutionality of
Sunday closing laws, his book may not be of particular interest to the practicing
attorney. Nevertheless, the author does have a definite message for theologians,
lawyers, and state legislatures:
To keep today's organized religion, Christianity, close to the personal compassionate Christ, Tillich suggests paying particular attention to the role
of the Jew. "One thing for Christians to remember is that the very
existence of Judaism is a corrective against pagan danger," ......

When-

ever a church seeks to impose on other members of the society the religious content of its faith, no matter how it may clothe that content
16 KARL ADAM, THE SPnuRT OF CATHOLicISM 60-61 (1954). Karl Adam calls a spontaneous type of religion one that
behaves as though Christianity is and must be a mere object of knowledge,
a mere subject for scientific investigation, as though the living Christian
faith could be resolved into a series of ideas and notions ....
Christianity
then becomes, not unitary, original and abounding life, but a juxtaposition
of ideas and conceptions, which ... have gradually by the power of collective faith gathered round the person of Jesus of Nazareth ...
He notes that the Catholic Church is an organized body of members in which these members are joined externally and internally; the Church is not just an adviser and guide.
The more closely the Catholic then gets into touch with his Church, not
merely externally, but internally, with her prayer and sacrifice, with her
word and sacrament, the more sensitive and attentive will he be to the
inspiration of the divine Spirit in the community, the more vitally will he
grasp the divine life that flows through the organism of the Church.
17
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Canon 1248 provides:

Mass must be heard; moreover, there is also an obligation

to abstain from servile work, from judicial acts and, unless lawful custom
or particular indults justify them, from public marketing, the holding of
fairs, and any other kind of public commercial occupation involving buying
and selling.
Text at 144:
Sunday invites caricature. There are special Sundays set aside for themes
in addition to that of the Lord's Day. Reformation Sunday at the end of
October, Universal Bible Sunday and Student Recognition Sunday in December, Holy Family Sunday in January, Brotherhood, Mother's, Father's,
Children's Sundays, a "film Sunday" observed by Australian Roman Catholics, a "traffic safety sabbath" observed throughout Illinois churches on
the Sunday before Labor Day -

to name a few.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
in terms of desirability, the church has resorted to tyranny and become
or secular, that are contrary to the
a slave of pagan forces, religious
19
spirit of its Savior and Redeemer.

The benefits to the Christian churches resulting from this respect in our country
for such a commitment to the rights and views of the minority, are easily demonstrable.20 On the basis of this commitment to saving the Jews and other believers
who do not observe Sunday, any religious body, no matter how much it disagrees
with the author's premises and theology, will have to agree that our Sunday closing
laws need to be rethought and possibly changed. Perhaps a two or three-day
week end could be the answer to the Sunday closing law conflict. The author agrees
21
that such an approach might be the state's "relization of all its worship goals."
If not, how about an elective system for the benefit of the Jew and the possible
Wednesday worshipper, with a mandatory closing on Sunday otherwise?"
For now, Space-Age Sunday poses, and provides contemporary thought and
historical views on Sunday laws; it presents a unique proposal for reconsideration

of the Sunday closing law issues by Protestants and Catholics. We can be sure that

United States do some rethinking, they
if the dominant religious groups in 2the
3
will be heard by the state legislatures.

Thomas M. Clusserath

19

Id. at 86.

20

MURRAY,

WE

HOLD

THESE

TRUTHS:

CATHOLIC

REFLECTIONS

ON

THE AMERICAN

PROPoSITION 73-74 (1960).
Religion itself, and not the least the Catholic Church has benefited by our
free institutions, by the maintenance, even in exaggerated form, of the distinction between church and state. Within the same span of history the
experience of the Church elsewhere, especially in Latin lands, has been
alternately an experience of privilege or persecution. . . . It would be difficult to say which experience, privilege or persecution, proved in the end
to be more damaging or gainful to the Church.
21 Text at 134.
22 Note, 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 405, 432 (1960); Recent Decision, 35 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 569, 572-73 (1960).
23 Text at 124.
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